Applications Regarding Joint Enterprises or Arrangements and Certain Profit-Sharing Plans
SEC Rule 17d-1, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-1 under the Investment Company Act of 1940, implements Section 17(d)'s prohibition on joint transactions between registered investment companies and their affiliated persons by requiring that any affiliated person of or principal underwriter for a registered fund — and any affiliated person of such a person — acting as principal may not participate in or effect any transaction in connection with any joint enterprise, other joint arrangement, or profit-sharing plan in which the registered fund is a participant, unless an application regarding the joint enterprise has been filed with the Commission and approved by order prior to the fund's entry into the arrangement.
The rule provides seven enumerated exemptions from the application and approval requirement — including exemptions for qualified retirement plans, small business investment company lending arrangements, certain portfolio affiliate joint enterprises, and the fund governance standards-conditioned exemption of Rule 17d-1(d)(7) that permits qualifying joint enterprises and arrangements between a fund and its investment adviser without prior Commission approval where the fund's board satisfies the enhanced governance standards of Rule 0-1(a)(7).
Rule 17d-1 addresses a category of affiliated transaction risk that Section 17(a)'s direct purchase and sale prohibition and the other affiliated transaction rules do not fully encompass — the risk that joint ventures, co-investment arrangements, profit-sharing plans, and similar joint participation structures could be used by a fund's affiliates to create shared interests with the fund in ways that favour the affiliated participants at the fund's expense, without those arrangements taking the form of outright purchases or sales that Section 17(a) directly addresses.
Overview and Regulatory Purpose
Section 17(d) of the Investment Company Act prohibits any affiliated person of or principal underwriter for a registered investment company, or any affiliated person of such a person or principal underwriter, acting as principal, from effecting any transaction in which such registered company or a company controlled by such company is a joint or joint and several participant with such person, underwriter, or affiliated person in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe for the purpose of limiting or preventing participation by such registered company on a basis different from or less advantageous than that of such other participant.
This statutory prohibition reflects the Investment Company Act's recognition that joint transaction structures — arrangements in which the fund and its affiliates participate together in a common enterprise — present a category of conflict of interest that is distinct from and potentially more complex than the outright purchase and sale transactions that Section 17(a) addresses.
The joint enterprise problem arises from the structural reality that arrangements in which a registered fund and its affiliates participate as co-investors, co-lenders, co-venturers, or co-participants in profit-sharing plans create ongoing shared interests that may not be resolved through the same independent pricing mechanism that governs securities purchase and sale transactions.
A fund's investment adviser that also participates with the fund in a joint lending arrangement to a portfolio company has a continuing economic interest in that arrangement's performance that may diverge from the fund's interest in ways that are difficult to identify and manage on a transaction-by-transaction basis — the conflict of interest is not a point-in-time pricing issue but a structural feature of the joint relationship throughout its duration.
Rule 17d-1 addresses this structural conflict by requiring that most joint arrangements involving a registered fund and its affiliates receive prior Commission approval — ensuring that the Commission can assess whether the specific terms of each joint enterprise are consistent with the fund's interests and consistent with the general purposes of the Investment Company Act — while providing exemptions for categories of arrangement whose investor protection implications have been assessed at the rule level and found consistent with investor protection under the specified conditions.
Statutory Authority and Rulemaking History
Rule 17d-1 derives its statutory authority from Section 17(d) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, which expressly authorises the Commission to prescribe rules governing the participation of registered investment companies in joint transactions with their affiliated persons. Section 17(d)'s specific grant of joint transaction rulemaking authority is the direct statutory foundation for Rule 17d-1's prohibition, application requirement, and exemptions framework.
Rule 17d-1 has been in the Investment Company Act rules since the early decades of the Act's administration, with its exemptions framework progressively expanded through amendments to accommodate categories of joint arrangement whose investor protection implications were assessed at the rule level and found compatible with the exemption approach.
The January 14, 2003 amendment — adopted as part of the Transactions of Investment Companies with Portfolio and Subadviser Affiliates rulemaking — updated Rule 17d-1's exemptions framework to add the portfolio affiliate joint enterprise exemption of Rule 17d-1(d)(5) and to update the sub-adviser related provisions.
The fund governance standards condition of Rule 0-1(a)(7) was added to Rule 17d-1 through the 2004 Investment Company Governance rulemaking, conditioning Rule 17d-1(d)(7)'s exemption on board governance standard compliance effective January 15, 2006. No changes have been made to Rule 17d-1's operative provisions up to the present time.
Key Provisions and Operative Requirements
Rule 17d-1(a) establishes the foundational prohibition and application requirement. No affiliated person of or principal underwriter for any registered investment company — other than companies of the character described in Section 12(d)(3)(A) and (B) of the Act — and no affiliated person of such a person or principal underwriter, acting as principal, shall participate in or effect any transaction in connection with any joint enterprise or other joint arrangement or profit-sharing plan in which any such registered company or a company controlled by it is a participant, and which is entered into, adopted, or modified after the rule's effective date, unless an application regarding the joint enterprise has been filed with the Commission and has been granted by an order entered prior to the fund's entry into or adoption of the plan or modification.
This prior approval requirement is the rule's primary operative mechanism — it establishes Commission review and approval as the default prerequisite for affiliated joint transactions, rather than relying on fund-level governance to independently assess the terms of such arrangements.
In reviewing applications under Rule 17d-1(a), the Commission must find that the participation of the registered fund in the joint enterprise or arrangement on the basis proposed is consistent with the provisions, policies, and purposes of the Investment Company Act and the extent to which such participation is on a basis different from or less advantageous than that of other participants. This review standard reflects Section 17(d)'s specific concern — that the fund's participation in the joint arrangement be on terms at least as favourable as those available to the affiliated participants — rather than merely a general public interest finding.
Rule 17d-1(d) establishes seven specific exemptions from the application and approval requirement. These exemptions collectively address the categories of joint arrangement that the Commission determined could be permitted without case-by-case approval because their investor protection implications could be adequately addressed through rule-based conditions applied uniformly.
Rule 17d-1(d)(1) exempts any transaction solely between registered investment companies that are not affiliated persons of each other, other than by reason of having a common investment adviser, common directors, or common officers — permitting ordinary co-investment activity between unaffiliated funds without the Commission approval that would be required if both funds were affiliates of each other for other reasons.
Rule 17d-1(d)(2) exempts any qualified Section 401 defined contribution plan provided by a registered investment company or controlled company for its officers or employees, recognising that employee retirement benefit plans are not the kind of self-dealing joint arrangement that Section 17(d) was designed to prevent.
Rule 17d-1(d)(3) exempts certain small business investment company lending arrangements under the Small Business Investment Act, accommodating the specific investment structure of SBICs that make joint loans alongside affiliated banks without triggering the Investment Company Act's joint transaction prohibition.
Rule 17d-1(d)(4) exempts transactions under interfund lending programmes established pursuant to orders that the Commission has issued permitting affiliated funds within the same complex to lend to and borrow from one another — the interfund lending exemption that enables efficient cash management within affiliated fund families while maintaining the investor protection conditions that the Commission's interfund lending orders specifically require.
Rule 17d-1(d)(5) — the portfolio affiliate joint enterprise exemption — provides that any joint enterprise or arrangement in which a registered investment company and a portfolio affiliate are participants is exempt from the application requirement, provided no prohibited participant has a direct or indirect financial interest in the arrangement other than through the registered fund, and if any prohibited participant does have such an interest, the fund's board of directors including a majority of non-interested directors determines that the financial interest is not material and records the basis for that finding in the board's meeting minutes. A portfolio affiliate is defined in Rule 17a-6(b)(3) as a person in which a registered fund holds a controlling interest — an investee company rather than a management affiliate — whose joint participation with the fund in commercial arrangements presents a materially different conflict of interest profile from the participation of management affiliates such as the investment adviser or principal underwriter.
Rule 17d-1(d)(7) — the fund governance standards exemption — provides that any joint enterprise or arrangement between a registered investment company and an affiliated person of the fund is exempt from the application requirement, provided the fund's board of directors satisfies the fund governance standards defined in Rule 0-1(a)(7) and certain additional conditions specific to the nature of the joint arrangement are met. This exemption — one of the ten Exemptive Rules for which Rule 0-1(a)(7)'s enhanced governance framework is a condition — enables a broad range of commercially important joint arrangements between registered funds and their affiliated advisers, underwriters, and related entities without requiring Commission approval for each arrangement, relying instead on the enhanced independent director oversight of boards satisfying the Rule 0-1(a)(7) governance standards to assess and approve such arrangements in the fund's shareholders' interests.
Scope of Application
Rule 17d-1 applies to all joint enterprises, arrangements, and profit-sharing plans involving registered investment companies — open-end mutual funds, ETFs, closed-end funds, interval funds, BDCs, and money market funds — and their affiliated persons and principal underwriters.
The scope of joint arrangement subject to the rule is broad — it encompasses co-investment arrangements in private credit, infrastructure, and real estate; shared service arrangements between affiliated funds and their advisers; profit-sharing arrangements through which affiliated entities receive a share of fund profits; and any other arrangement through which an affiliated person participates alongside the fund in a common enterprise on terms that could differ from those available to the fund alone.
The commercial landscape for joint arrangements between registered funds and their affiliates has expanded significantly in the post-financial crisis era as registered funds — including interval funds and BDCs subject to Rule 23c-3's periodic repurchase framework — have increasingly invested in private credit, direct lending, and alternative asset categories alongside their investment advisers' other clients, including affiliated private funds. These co-investment arrangements — where the registered fund and an affiliated private fund invest side by side in the same private credit or direct lending transactions — are among the most commercially significant and regulatory scrutiny-intensive applications of Rule 17d-1's joint enterprise framework.
Relationship to Related Rules and Regulations
Rule 17d-1's joint enterprise prohibition operates alongside Section 17(a)'s direct purchase and sale prohibition as complementary components of the Investment Company Act's comprehensive affiliated transaction regulatory framework. Where Section 17(a) and its implementing rules — including Rule 17a-7's cross-trading exemption — address bilateral purchase and sale transactions between a registered fund and its affiliates, Rule 17d-1 addresses the broader category of joint participation arrangements that do not take the form of outright bilateral transactions. The two frameworks together constitute the complete affiliated transaction regulatory structure applicable to registered funds' relationships with their affiliates.
Rule 17d-1's fund governance standards condition in Rule 17d-1(d)(7) connects the joint enterprise exemption directly to Rule 0-1(a)(7)'s comprehensive governance framework — the same enhanced independence, self-assessment, quarterly meeting, and independent hiring authority requirements that condition the availability of Rules 10f-3, 12b-1, 17a-7, 17e-1, and 23c-3 apply equally to Rule 17d-1(d)(7). This shared governance prerequisite reinforces the Investment Company Act's consistent treatment of affiliated transaction management as a governance function requiring enhanced independent director oversight beyond the basic statutory minimum.
Rule 38a-1's compliance programme framework requires that registered fund compliance programmes specifically address Rule 17d-1 compliance — including the procedures for identifying joint arrangements in which affiliated persons participate alongside the fund, assessing whether applicable exemptions are available or whether Commission approval is required, documenting the board's approval of exemption-eligible arrangements, and maintaining the six-year records required by the rule for qualifying arrangements.
Amendment History and Regulatory Evolution
Rule 17d-1's operative framework has been substantially stable since the January 2003 amendment that added the portfolio affiliate exemption and the 2004 fund governance standards condition. The rule's basic structure — prior Commission approval as the default, with specific exemptions for categories of arrangement assessed at the rule level — has remained the operative framework throughout the decades since the rule's original adoption.
The most significant contemporary regulatory development affecting Rule 17d-1's practical application is the growth of co-investment arrangements between registered funds and affiliated private funds in the private credit, direct lending, and alternative asset categories — arrangements that require careful analysis of whether they constitute joint enterprises subject to Rule 17d-1's framework and, if so, whether an applicable exemption is available or Commission approval through the application process is required. The Commission's exemptive application process — through which registered funds and their affiliates seek co-investment orders permitting joint investment in the same transactions under standardised conditions — remains an active component of the Division of Investment Management's workload, reflecting the ongoing commercial demand for co-investment flexibility beyond what Rule 17d-1's existing exemptions accommodate.
Enforcement Context and SEC Action Patterns
Rule 17d-1 enforcement has concentrated on joint arrangements entered into without the required prior Commission approval and without qualifying for one of Rule 17d-1(d)'s specific exemptions — cases where affiliated persons participated in joint arrangements with registered funds without satisfying either the application requirement or the available exemption conditions. These violations are typically discovered through the Commission's examination programme rather than through investor complaints, since the joint arrangement's existence may not be visible to the fund's shareholders in the absence of specific disclosure.
The Commission's no-action letter programme has addressed numerous Rule 17d-1 compliance questions, providing interpretive guidance on whether specific arrangements constitute joint enterprises subject to the rule and whether particular arrangements qualify for existing exemptions or require individual Commission approval. These no-action positions — including the recent no-action relief permitting a fund to enter a transaction agreement with a new adviser under Section 17 and Rule 17d-1 — illustrate the rule's continuing relevance to the full range of commercial arrangements between registered funds and their affiliated management entities.
Examination Relevance and Key Takeaways
Rule 17d-1 is examined at the Series 65 level as the joint transaction prohibition for registered investment companies — addressing the category of affiliated conflict of interest that arises when a registered fund and its affiliates participate together in joint enterprises and arrangements rather than engaging in bilateral purchase and sale transactions. The default application and Commission approval requirement — and its significance as the baseline that the rule's specific exemptions depart from — is the primary examination concept.
The fund governance standards condition of Rule 17d-1(d)(7) — connecting the joint enterprise exemption to Rule 0-1(a)(7)'s enhanced governance framework — is examined as one of the ten Exemptive Rules for which governance standard compliance is a prerequisite, illustrating the consistent governance theme across the Investment Company Act's affiliated transaction regulatory framework.
The key points to retain are these. Rule 17d-1 prohibits any first-tier or second-tier affiliate of a registered investment company, acting as principal, from participating in any joint enterprise, arrangement, or profit-sharing plan in which the fund is a participant without prior Commission application and approval. The rule provides seven specific exemptions from the prior approval requirement, including: transactions between unaffiliated funds with common advisers, directors, or officers; qualified Section 401 retirement plans; SBIC lending arrangements; interfund lending under Commission orders; portfolio affiliate joint enterprises where prohibited participants have no or only immaterial financial interests; and fund governance standards-conditioned joint arrangements under Rule 17d-1(d)(7) — one of the ten Exemptive Rules requiring Rule 0-1(a)(7) governance standard compliance. Co-investment arrangements between registered funds and affiliated private funds in private credit and alternative asset categories are among the most commercially significant contemporary applications of Rule 17d-1's joint enterprise framework, with co-investment exemptive orders remaining an active part of the Commission's exemptive application practice. Rule 17d-1 was last amended January 14, 2003. No changes have been made to its operative provisions up to the present time.
