Going Private Transactions by Issuers and Their Affiliates
SEC Rule 13e-3, codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-3 under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, establishes the filing, disclosure, and dissemination requirements applicable to going private transactions — transactions through which an issuer or its affiliate takes a public company private by eliminating, or causing the reasonable likelihood of eliminating, the class of equity securities from Exchange Act registration or reporting requirements.
The rule requires issuers and affiliates engaging in covered transactions to file Schedule 13E-3 with the Commission, to disclose the transaction's terms and the filer's reasons for and beliefs about the fairness of those terms to unaffiliated shareholders, and to provide that disclosure to the security holders who are the subject of the transaction.
Rule 13e-3 addresses one of the most acute structural conflicts of interest in the corporate governance landscape: the going private transaction in which the controlling insider or majority shareholder simultaneously acts as buyer — seeking to acquire the minority shareholders' interests at the lowest possible price — and as fiduciary — obligated to act in the minority shareholders' best interests.
The rule's fairness disclosure requirement, which mandates that the issuer and affiliate express a substantive view on whether the transaction is fair to unaffiliated shareholders and identify all material information supporting that view, is the primary mechanism through which the Exchange Act's disclosure framework addresses this conflict.
Overview and Regulatory Purpose
The going private transaction — whether accomplished through a merger in which the controlling shareholder freezes out the minority, a tender offer in which the affiliate acquires sufficient shares to force a deregistration, or a reverse stock split that eliminates small shareholders — creates an information asymmetry that is qualitatively different from the disclosure challenges presented by arm's-length transactions.
In an ordinary merger or acquisition, the buyer and seller negotiate at arm's length, each with their own advisers, and the disclosed terms are the product of a bargaining process in which both sides' interests are represented. In a going private transaction, the buyer — the controlling shareholder or affiliate — is on both sides of the transaction: it controls the issuer, has access to non-public information about its assets and prospects, and simultaneously determines the terms of the transaction that minority shareholders will be offered and the adequacy of the disclosure minority shareholders will receive.
Rule 13e-3's disclosure framework is designed to mitigate this structural asymmetry by requiring the controlling party to explain, in a public document reviewed by Commission staff, why the transaction is fair to the minority shareholders it is eliminating.
The fairness analysis requirement — which demands disclosure of the factors considered, the weight given to each, and any reports, opinions, or appraisals received in support of the fairness determination — is not a rule that can be satisfied by boilerplate assertions of fairness. Commission staff and courts have consistently required that the fairness analysis be substantive, specific, and supported by identifiable factual predicates, and have challenged going private disclosures that make vague fairness assertions without adequate analytical foundation.
Statutory Authority and Rulemaking History
Rule 13e-3 derives its statutory authority from Section 13(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which authorises the Commission to prescribe rules and regulations governing purchases by issuers of their own securities and to require disclosure of material information in connection with those purchases. Section 13(e)'s authority extends to transactions by affiliates of the issuer as well, providing the statutory basis for the rule's application to going private transactions by controlling shareholders and other affiliates rather than by the issuer alone.
The Commission originally adopted Rule 13e-3 on August 2, 1979 — Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-16075, published at 44 FR 46741 — implementing the going private disclosure framework that the Commission had been developing since the mid-1970s in response to a surge of freeze-out and squeeze-out transactions following the oil crisis.
The rule has been amended on multiple occasions to reflect changes in the deregistration framework — particularly the 2008 amendments that aligned Rule 13e-3 with the new Rule 12h-6 foreign private issuer deregistration framework — and to address evolving transaction structures and interpretive questions. No substantive amendments to Rule 13e-3's operative text have been adopted since 2008, and no pending rulemaking proposes amendments through June 2026.
Key Provisions and Operative Requirements
Rule 13e-3(a)(3) defines a Rule 13e-3 transaction — the threshold concept that determines when the rule's filing, disclosure, and dissemination requirements are triggered. A Rule 13e-3 transaction is any transaction or series of transactions involving one or more of three enumerated transaction types — a purchase of securities by the issuer or its affiliate; a tender offer for or request or invitation for tenders of a security by the issuer or its affiliate; or a solicitation subject to Regulation 14A or distribution subject to Regulation 14C in connection with a merger, recapitalisation, reclassification, consolidation, dissolution, or similar transaction — which has either a reasonable likelihood or a purpose of causing a class of equity securities to be held of record by fewer than 300 persons, or causing a class of equity securities to become eligible for the termination of Exchange Act registration under Rule 12g-4 or Rule 12h-6, or causing the suspension of Exchange Act reporting obligations under Rule 12h-3.
The reasonable likelihood or purpose standard is deliberately expansive — it captures not only transactions explicitly designed to take the issuer private but also transactions that, while not explicitly labelled as going private transactions, have a substantial probability of producing that effect based on their structure and likely outcome.
A partial tender offer that, if fully subscribed, would reduce the record holder count below 300 and enable deregistration, falls within the definition even if the issuer does not publicly describe the transaction as a going private. Similarly, a reverse stock split designed to cash out fractional shareholders resulting from the split — a common technique for eliminating small shareholders at minimal cost — constitutes a Rule 13e-3 transaction if it has a reasonable likelihood of causing the record holder count to fall below the deregistration threshold.
Rule 13e-3(b) establishes the general prohibition and affirmative obligation. An issuer or affiliate that engages in a Rule 13e-3 transaction is prohibited from engaging in that transaction unless it complies with the disclosure, filing, and dissemination requirements of the rule.
An issuer or affiliate that has commenced or is about to commence a Rule 13e-3 transaction must file a Schedule 13E-3 with the Commission, must disseminate the required disclosure to the security holders of the class of equity securities that is the subject of the transaction, and must promptly disclose any material change in the information previously disclosed.
Rule 13e-3(e) establishes the substantive disclosure requirements. Among the items that must be included in Schedule 13E-3 and the disclosure materials sent to security holders are: the purposes of the transaction and the reasons for the chosen transaction structure; the alternatives to the proposed transaction that were considered and the reasons those alternatives were rejected; the effects of the transaction on the issuer, its affiliates, and the unaffiliated security holders; the fairness of the transaction to the unaffiliated security holders, including a detailed statement of the factors considered in determining fairness and whether any of those factors were given particular weight; any report, opinion, or appraisal received from an outside party relating to the fairness of the consideration to unaffiliated shareholders, including the full text of any fairness opinion received from an investment bank; and the issuer's and affiliate's position on the fairness of the transaction, expressed as a substantive judgment — not merely a recitation of factors — on whether the transaction is fair to unaffiliated security holders.
The fairness disclosure is the most commercially and legally significant component of Schedule 13E-3. Both the issuer and the affiliate — where both are filing persons — must separately express a substantive view on the transaction's fairness to unaffiliated shareholders and must disclose all material information supporting that view. A fairness determination that relies on a third-party fairness opinion must disclose the full text of the opinion and all material assumptions and methodologies underlying it.
Where the transaction price was determined through arms-length negotiation with a special committee of independent directors, the disclosure must fully describe the special committee's process, the advisers it retained, and the analytical framework it applied.
Rule 13e-3(d) governs the timing of required filings. Where the Rule 13e-3 transaction involves a solicitation subject to Regulation 14A or Regulation 14C — most commonly, a going private merger requiring shareholder approval — Schedule 13E-3 must be filed concurrently with the preliminary proxy or information statement, at least 30 days before any purchase of the subject securities. Where the transaction involves a tender offer subject to Rule 13e-4, Schedule 13E-3 must be filed as soon as practicable on the date the tender offer materials are first published or sent to security holders.
Rule 13e-3(g) provides three categories of exemption. The rule does not apply where the security to be purchased or exchanged is not registered under Section 12 of the Exchange Act. It also does not apply where the issuer has fewer than 300 holders of record of the class of equity securities subject to the transaction at the time of the transaction.
Third, a specific exemption applies where the consideration offered to non-affiliates consists solely of the issuer's or affiliate's equity securities or a combination of those securities and cash and the consideration offered or paid to affiliates is not greater in amount or value than the consideration offered or paid to non-affiliates.
Scope of Application
Rule 13e-3 applies to transactions involving issuers that have a class of equity securities registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Exchange Act — both Section 12(b) exchange-listed issuers and Section 12(g) over-the-counter registered issuers. It does not apply to issuers whose reporting obligations arise solely under Section 15(d) rather than Section 12, since Section 15(d) issuers are not subject to Section 13(e)'s going private transaction requirements.
The rule applies both to the issuer and to any affiliate of the issuer engaging in the going private transaction. In a leveraged buyout by a controlling shareholder or private equity sponsor that is an affiliate of the issuer, both the issuer — which is conducting the proxy solicitation seeking shareholder approval — and the affiliate buyer must file as co-filing persons on Schedule 13E-3. Both must separately address the fairness of the transaction from their respective perspectives, creating a dual disclosure obligation that reflects the bilateral conflict of interest present in affiliate going private transactions.
Relationship to Related Rules and Regulations
Rule 13e-3 operates in direct conjunction with Rule 13e-4, which governs issuer tender offers — the companion rule for the specific transaction type in which an issuer or affiliate conducts a tender offer as part of the going private mechanism. Where a Rule 13e-3 transaction is structured as an issuer tender offer, both Rule 13e-3 and Rule 13e-4 apply simultaneously, with Rule 13e-4's timing mechanics governing when the offer materials are published and Rule 13e-3's disclosure requirements governing the substantive content of those materials.
The going private transaction's interaction with Regulation 14A — the proxy solicitation rules — is the most common context in which Rule 13e-3 filings arise in practice. A freeze-out merger requiring shareholder approval requires the filing of a proxy statement under Regulation 14A and simultaneously requires the filing of Schedule 13E-3. In this circumstance, Rule 13e-3 permits the required disclosure to be included in the proxy statement itself rather than as a separate document, provided the proxy statement is filed with the Commission at the time specified in Regulation 14A and contains all required Schedule 13E-3 disclosure items. This integration of the going private disclosure into the proxy statement is the prevailing market practice and eliminates the need for a separate Schedule 13E-3 disclosure document in most going private merger transactions.
Rule 13e-3 also connects to Rule 13d-1's beneficial ownership reporting framework. A controlling shareholder that is accumulating shares in preparation for a going private transaction may simultaneously trigger Schedule 13D filing obligations — and the transition from Schedule 13G passive reporting to Schedule 13D active reporting — as its ownership and intentions change in ways that require beneficial ownership disclosure under the five-business-day deadline applicable to schedule 13D filers.
Amendment History and Regulatory Evolution
Rule 13e-3's most significant post-adoption amendment was in 2008, in connection with the Commission's adoption of the Rule 12h-6 framework governing foreign private issuer deregistration. That amendment updated Rule 13e-3's going private effect definition to include transactions causing a class of equity securities to become eligible for deregistration under Rule 12h-6, ensuring that foreign private issuers conducting going private transactions in their home markets but with Exchange Act registration consequences were captured within the rule's disclosure framework.
The broader evolution of the going private transaction landscape since Rule 13e-3's adoption has been shaped more by Delaware corporate law doctrine and investment banking practice than by formal SEC rulemaking. The development of the MFW standard in Delaware — requiring approval by both an independent special committee and an uncoerced majority-of-the-minority shareholder vote as conditions for entire fairness review deferential to the transaction parties — has created a parallel accountability framework for going private transactions that supplements Rule 13e-3's federal disclosure requirements with substantive judicial oversight of the fairness process itself. The widespread adoption of MFW procedures for going private transactions has progressively increased the substantive quality of the independent process that underlies the Rule 13e-3 fairness disclosure, since the prospect of fiduciary litigation gives the special committee and its advisers strong incentives to conduct a genuinely rigorous review.
Enforcement Context and SEC Action Patterns
Rule 13e-3 enforcement has concentrated on two primary categories. The first involves failures to file Schedule 13E-3 in connection with transactions that qualify as Rule 13e-3 transactions — cases where the issuer or affiliate structured a going private transaction but failed to recognise that the transaction fell within the rule's reasonable likelihood of going private definition, or where the transaction was deliberately structured to avoid the rule's trigger while achieving its substantive effect. The Commission has taken the position that the reasonable likelihood standard is evaluated objectively, and that structural choices designed to keep a transaction technically below the trigger threshold while practically achieving a going private outcome will be scrutinised as potential evasions.
The second enforcement category involves materially deficient Schedule 13E-3 disclosures — particularly inadequate fairness analysis, failure to disclose material conflicts of interest affecting the advisers rendering fairness opinions, and inadequate disclosure of the process through which the transaction price was determined. The Division of Corporation Finance's review of Schedule 13E-3 filings through its comment letter programme is the primary mechanism through which disclosure deficiencies are identified and corrected before the transaction closes, and the Commission has issued extensive guidance through telephone interpretations and C&DIs on the adequacy of fairness disclosure in specific factual contexts.
A February 11, 2026 C&DI addressed the specific question of whether Rule 13e-3 applies to an issuer tender offer containing an express non-waivable condition that the issuer would not purchase any amount of securities that would have a reasonable likelihood or purpose of producing a going private effect — confirming that under those circumstances Rule 13e-3 would generally not apply, since the transaction is expressly conditioned on not producing the effect that triggers the rule.
Examination Relevance and Key Takeaways
Rule 13e-3 is examined at the Series 65 level in the context of Exchange Act corporate transactions and the disclosure obligations applicable to controlling shareholder freeze-out transactions. Candidates should understand the definition of a Rule 13e-3 transaction — any transaction by an issuer or affiliate that has a reasonable likelihood or purpose of causing a class of equity securities to become eligible for deregistration or suspension of reporting — and the core disclosure obligation: the filing of Schedule 13E-3 and the dissemination of required disclosure to security holders, including a substantive fairness analysis addressing the transaction's fairness to unaffiliated shareholders.
The three Rule 13e-3(g) exemptions — fewer than 300 record holders, no Section 12 registration of subject securities, and affiliate consideration not greater than non-affiliate consideration — are relevant examination concepts for distinguishing transactions subject to the rule from those that are not.
The key points to retain are these. Rule 13e-3 applies to going private transactions — purchases, tender offers, or merger-related solicitations by an issuer or its affiliate that have a reasonable likelihood or purpose of eliminating or reducing a class of equity securities below the thresholds for Exchange Act registration or reporting. The rule requires filing of Schedule 13E-3 and dissemination of required disclosure to affected security holders, including a substantive fairness analysis addressing whether the transaction is fair to unaffiliated shareholders, the factors considered, and any reports or opinions received from third parties. Both the issuer and the affiliate must separately express fairness views where both are filing persons. Where the transaction involves a proxy solicitation, the required disclosure may be incorporated into the proxy statement. The Schedule 13E-3 must be filed concurrently with preliminary proxy materials at least 30 days before any purchase of subject securities, or as soon as practicable on the date tender offer materials are first published. Exemptions apply where the subject securities are not Section 12-registered, where the issuer has fewer than 300 record holders, or where affiliate consideration does not exceed non-affiliate consideration. Rule 13e-3 has not been substantively amended since 2008 and no pending rulemaking proposes changes through June 2026.
