Table of Contents
SERIES 7 | SERIES 65 | FINANCIAL REGULATION COURSES
FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-19 — Risks of Using Stop Orders — issued in May 2016, is FINRA's comprehensive guidance document addressing the risks associated with stop orders and stop-loss orders during volatile market conditions, reminding member firms and their registered representatives of their obligations to ensure that customers who use stop orders fully understand that stop prices are not guaranteed execution prices, that a stop order becomes a market order when its stop price is reached and is thereafter subject to the same execution risks as any market order, and that the specific market structure features of the modern equity markets — including limit-up limit-down price bands, market-wide circuit breakers, and individual security trading pauses — can interact with stop orders in ways that produce execution outcomes significantly different from what customers typically expect when they place these orders.
The notice was directly motivated by the market volatility episode of August 24, 2015 — a day on which the United States equity markets opened with extraordinary disorder that produced rapid, severe price declines in hundreds of securities, triggered multiple individual security trading halts under the limit-up limit-down mechanism, and resulted in thousands of stop orders being triggered and then executed at prices dramatically below their stop prices as a consequence of the interaction between the stop order trigger and the market structure mechanisms that were simultaneously operating to manage the volatile conditions. Many investors who had placed stop orders specifically as protective mechanisms — intending to limit their downside exposure — discovered that their stop orders had been executed at prices far below their intended exit levels, producing losses substantially larger than the investors had expected or intended when placing the orders.
A stop order — also called a stop-loss order — is a conditional order that instructs a broker-dealer to execute a transaction when the price of a security reaches a specified trigger price known as the stop price. The stop order is inactive — it sits in the system without being executed — until the market price of the security reaches the stop price, at which point the stop order is activated and becomes a market order to be executed at the best available price.
A stop sell order — the most common form, used by investors seeking to limit losses or protect profits on long positions — specifies a stop price below the current market price. If the security's price falls to the stop price the stop sell order activates and becomes a market sell order — to be executed at whatever price the market will bear for an immediate sale. An investor who purchases a security at fifty dollars and places a stop sell order at forty-five dollars intends to limit their maximum loss to approximately five dollars per share — selling if the price falls to forty-five to avoid further losses if the price continues to decline.
A stop buy order — used primarily by short sellers seeking to limit losses on short positions — specifies a stop price above the current market price. If the security's price rises to the stop price the stop buy order activates and becomes a market buy order.
Stop-limit orders — a variant that specifies both a stop price and a limit price — address the guaranteed execution problem by converting to a limit order rather than a market order when the stop price is reached. A stop-limit order will only execute at the specified limit price or better — protecting the investor from execution at a dramatically worse price than intended. However the stop-limit order introduces execution risk — if the security gaps through both the stop price and the limit price without trading at any price within the limit the order may not be executed at all.
The August 24, 2015 market opening was one of the most disorderly in the recent history of United States equity markets — driven by a combination of global market weakness, extreme pre-market selling pressure in exchange-traded funds, and a market structure response to that pressure through the limit-up limit-down mechanism that created a cascade of individual security trading halts that interacted in unexpected ways with the stop orders that investors had placed to protect their positions.
As the equity markets opened on August 24, 2015 the prices of many securities — particularly those included in major ETFs that were themselves experiencing unusual pre-market price pressure — fell dramatically in the first minutes of trading. The limit-up limit-down mechanism — which requires that trading in any NMS stock be halted for a specified period if the price moves outside specified percentage bands from a reference price — triggered on dozens of securities simultaneously during the opening minutes of trading.
The interaction between the rapid price declines and the limit-up limit-down trading halts created a specific problem for stop orders — when a security's price fell rapidly below the stop price of a held stop order and then triggered a limit-down trading halt the stop order was activated by the initial price decline but could not be executed during the halt period. When trading resumed — sometimes at a price significantly below both the stop price and the price at which the halt was triggered — the activated stop order was executed as a market order at the resumed price, which in many cases was far below the investor's intended exit level.
Investors who had placed stop sell orders at forty-five dollars on positions purchased at fifty dollars — intending to limit their loss to approximately five dollars per share — discovered that their orders had been executed at thirty-five or thirty dollars — losses of fifteen to twenty dollars per share — because the combination of rapid price decline and trading halts had prevented execution near the stop price while transforming the stop into a market order that was executed at whatever price prevailed when trading resumed.
Regulatory Notice 16-19 identifies five specific risks of stop orders that member firms and registered representatives must disclose to customers who use these orders — each reflecting a specific mechanism through which stop order execution outcomes can diverge from customer expectations.
Stop prices are not guaranteed execution prices — this is the foundational risk disclosure. When a stop order is triggered by the security's price reaching the stop price the order becomes a market order and is executed at the best available price — which in fast-moving or halted markets may be significantly below the stop price for sell orders and significantly above the stop price for buy orders.
A stop order may be triggered by a short-lived, temporary price move — particularly during intraday volatility episodes where a security's price touches the stop price momentarily but then recovers. An investor who places a stop sell order at forty-five dollars on a security trading at fifty dollars may have their order triggered and executed during an intraday dip to forty-four dollars — even though the security closes the day at fifty-two dollars and the investor would have preferred not to sell had they known the dip was temporary.
The bid-ask spread may affect the stop price at which the order is triggered — if a stop sell order is triggered by a transaction occurring at the stop price rather than by the bid price the specific execution methodology can affect when the stop is activated relative to the investor's intended trigger point.
During a limit-up limit-down trading halt a stop order that has been triggered may not be executed for a significant period — and when trading resumes the execution price may differ substantially from the price at which the stop was triggered. This specific interaction between stop orders and limit-up limit-down trading halts was the most direct cause of the customer harm observed on August 24, 2015.
For stop orders that are good-till-cancelled — remaining active until executed or explicitly cancelled by the investor — the passage of time and changing market conditions may make the original stop price inappropriate or unintended — an investor who placed a stop order several months ago may have forgotten about it, or market conditions may have changed such that the original stop price no longer reflects the investor's current intentions.
Regulatory Notice 16-19 provides specific guidance on the steps member firms should take to address the risks of stop orders — balancing investor education and disclosure with consideration of systemic safeguards that reduce the likelihood of stop order outcomes that harm customers.
The notice encourages firms to provide targeted training to registered representatives regarding the risks associated with stop orders — ensuring that the professionals recommending these orders understand the specific mechanisms through which execution outcomes can diverge from customer expectations, particularly in volatile market conditions and in the context of limit-up limit-down trading halts.
The notice encourages firms to ensure that registered representatives consider alternative order types where appropriate — including stop-limit orders that limit the execution price range, limit orders that specify a maximum purchase or minimum sale price, and other protective strategies that achieve the investor's risk management objectives without the execution risk of standard stop orders converted to market orders.
For firms that allow customers to enter stop orders directly through online platforms the notice encourages prominent and clear disclosure of stop order risks at the time of order entry — ensuring that investors understand what they are placing before the order is submitted. A customer who understands that their stop sell order will become a market order when triggered — and that execution may occur significantly below the stop price during volatile conditions — can make an informed decision about whether to use a stop order or an alternative protective strategy.
The notice encourages firms to consider implementing systemic safeguards around the use of stop orders — including controls on stop orders that do not carry a limit price, special terms that limit the circumstances under which stop orders are executed, and automatic expiration of good-till-cancelled stop orders after a specified period to prevent forgotten orders from being executed in unexpected circumstances.
Regulatory Notice 16-19 connects to the best execution obligations of FINRA Rule 5310 — the rule requiring member firms to use reasonable diligence to obtain the most favourable execution reasonably available for customer orders — in the specific context of stop order handling during volatile markets.
The notice confirms that when a stop order has been triggered and becomes a market order the member firm must make every effort to execute the resulting market order fully and promptly at the current market price — consistent with Rule 5310's requirement for prompt execution of market orders. A delay in executing a triggered stop order due to market volatility or trading system congestion is not consistent with the firm's best execution obligations for the resulting market order.
The subsequent Regulatory Notice 21-12 — issued during the meme stock market volatility of 2021 — referenced Regulatory Notice 16-19's stop order guidance and connected it to the broader customer order handling obligations applicable during volatile market conditions — reinforcing the continued relevance of the 16-19 guidance framework across different volatile market episodes.
Regulatory Notice 16-19 describes the specific market structure mechanisms whose interaction with stop orders creates the risk of unexpected execution outcomes — connecting the practical guidance on stop orders to the regulatory framework governing market structure in the United States equity markets.
The limit-up limit-down mechanism — established by the NMS Plan to Address Extraordinary Market Volatility and implemented through FINRA Rule 6190 — prevents trades in NMS stocks from occurring outside specified price bands based on a reference price calculated from the preceding five minutes of trading. When a security's price approaches the lower band limit trading is briefly paused — providing an opportunity for additional liquidity to enter the market before trading resumes. During these pauses stop orders that have been triggered cannot be executed — and when trading resumes the price may have moved significantly from the pre-pause level.
Market-wide circuit breakers — triggered when major market indices decline by specified percentages from their opening levels — halt all trading in NMS stocks for specified periods, again preventing the execution of triggered stop orders until trading resumes.
FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-19 is tested on the Series 7 and Series 65 examinations in the context of stop orders, order types, volatile market conditions, and customer disclosure obligations.
The key points to retain are these.
FINRA Regulatory Notice 16-19 — issued May 2016 — was motivated by the August 24, 2015 market volatility episode in which thousands of stop orders were executed at prices dramatically below their stop prices as a result of the interaction between rapid price declines and limit-up limit-down trading halts. The notice identifies five key risks of stop orders that must be disclosed to customers — stop prices are not guaranteed execution prices, a stop order triggered by a temporary price move may result in an unintended sale, bid-ask spreads may affect trigger prices, limit-up limit-down trading halts may prevent execution of triggered stop orders and result in significantly worse prices when trading resumes, and good-till-cancelled stop orders may be triggered by forgotten orders in changed market conditions.
The core principle — a stop order becomes a market order when its stop price is reached and is thereafter subject to all of the execution risks of a market order — is the foundational disclosure that all customers using stop orders must understand. Member firms must provide targeted training to registered representatives on stop order risks, consider recommending stop-limit orders or other alternatives where appropriate, provide prominent risk disclosures to customers entering stop orders through online platforms, and consider systemic safeguards including controls on stop orders without limit prices and automatic expiration of good-till-cancelled orders. The triggered stop order must be executed promptly as a market order consistent with FINRA Rule 5310's best execution obligations.
